This paper makes two linked contributions. First, we argue that planning systems, instead of being correct (every plan returned achieves the goal) and complete (all such plans are returned), should be approximately correct and complete, in that most plans returned achieve the goal and that most such plans are returned. The rst contribution we make is to formalize this notion.
Introduction
When we talk about a plan for achieving a goal, we typically mean not one plan but many. As an example, if I say on Thanksgiving that my plan for preparing a turkey involves stu ng and roasting it, I hardly mean that these are the only actions I will take between now and when the turkey is done. I may also plan on making sweet potatoes and pumpkin pie, buying a bottle of wine, calling family members to wish them happy holidays, and other actions even further removed from my stated goal of turkey preparation.
In fact, my plan \stu the turkey and then roast it" might be represented something like this:
. . . stuff. . . roast. . . ] (1) where the ellipses denote currently undetermined action sequences that I might intersperse into the above plan. If I need to roast the turkey immediately after stu ng it, I might write that as . . . stuff roast. . . ] (2) where the second set of ellipses has been dropped.
There are, of course, many instance of (1) that are unsatisfactory. Perhaps I run the turkey through a paper shredder before beginning preparation, or unstu it after stu ng it, or garnish it liberally with peanut butter before serving. In what sense can we say that (1) is our plan when so many things can go wrong?
The conventional approach to this problem is to deal not with plans such as that appearing in (1) , but with far more speci c plans such as stuff yams telephone roast eat] where there are guaranteed to be no extraneous actions that might interfere with our achieving our goal. But from a practical point of view, the plan (3) is nearly worthless, since it is almost inconceivable that I execute it exactly as written.
There are many other examples of this phenomenon. If we intend to construct plans by retrieving them from a library of known solutions to similar problems (so-called case-based planning 14]), it is important that the plans in the library include some measure of exibility. After all, it is unlikely that the new situation in which we nd ourselves will be an exact match for the situation in which the plan was constructed.
Our ability to plan for conjunctive goals rests on similar ideas. When possible, it is important that we plan for conjuncts separately and then merge the results; this appears to require that the solutions to the individual conjuncts be plan schemas such as (1) . Planning for conjuncts separately enables us to take computational advantage of the benevolence of our environment as re ected in the frame assumption { we can typically achieve one subgoal and then not worry about it while we work on other things.
Another example of a conjunctive planning problem appears in Figure 1 . The goal is to get A on B and B on C, but there is a restriction to the e ect that one cannot build a four-block tower.
For a human planner, the problem is easy. We realize that the general plan for getting B onto C is simply to move it there, and similarly for getting A on B. When we combine these two plans, however, we encounter a problem { the action of moving A to B will fail. We therefore modify the plan for getting B onto C, adding the additional action of moving C to the table.
I presented this problem to the authors of two generative planning systems { Minton (prodigy 17]) and Wilkins (sipe 21] ). Both reported (personal communication) that the problem would pose no signi cant di culties for them and that they could solve it by adding an additional precondition to the action move(x; y) to the e ect that y had to be either on the table or on a block z that was on the table. 1 The problem with this approach is that it doubles the branching factor for all planning problems. This will lead to prohibitive computational di culties as the problems involved get larger; imagine having to move a block prior to constructing a 13-block tower in a domain that prohibits 14-block ones. As an example of the immediacy of these di culties, Penberthy and Weld's ucpop system 18] proved incapable of solving the 4-block version of the problem in Figure 1 without the inclusion of domain-speci c control information. 2 Worse still is the fact that the branching factor is being increased on all problems, not just those that involve tall towers. Imagine, for example, that we can only put a blue block on a red one if the red block is on the table. The branching factor will still be doubled even if we are working in a domain without blue blocks! 3 Explicit control rules provide potential ways around these particular di culties, but their use is problematic. What control rule are we to use if the previous domain includes painting actions, so that the colors of blocks can change? What control rule would allow us to e ciently solve the problem in Figure 1 if the constraint were changed so that only ve-block towers were prohibited? Related problems appear in plan debugging. If a human planner discovers a bug in one portion of a plan to achieve a complex goal, the typical response is to restrict the impact of the bug to a small portion of the analysis and to then plan around the problem. That we can make modi cations that address the bug without destroying the e ect of the original plan depends on our commonsense ability to construct and manipulate plans like (1) { plans that, while not holding universally, do hold in general.
My intention in this paper is to develop a formalization of the ideas that are implicit in the plan (1) , and to then describe the use of these constructs in conjunctive planning. Please bear with me while we work through the mathematics, since there are a variety of fundamentally new ideas that we need to formalize.
1. We rst need to describe plans that can have new actions added to them in arbitrary ways but that can still include the immediacy requirements of a plan such as (2) . This is our goal in the next section, where we also present a variety of mathematical results about these new plans that will be needed later. 2. We next need to de ne conditions under which a plan approximately achieves a goal.
The basic idea here is that a plan P is approximately correct if most instances of P that could actually be executed do indeed achieve the goal. We formalize this in Section 3 by introducing the idea of an exception to a plan and formalizing conditions under which plans hold su ciently frequently that we are prepared to treat them as approximately correct. 3. The problem of building a planner around these ideas is discussed in Sections 4 and 5.
Section 4 discusses the theoretical issues involved in the construction of the planner, showing that it is indeed possible to plan for conjuncts separately using our ideas. Section 5 discusses a preliminary implementation of our work.
4. Concluding remarks are contained in Section 6, and proofs have been deferred to an appendix. Let me end this introduction with something of a disclaimer. I do not mean to imply that existing implemented systems are incapable of manipulating expressions such as (1). Tate's O-Plan system, for example 2, 20], appears to use ideas such as these routinely. But planners that behave in this fashion have thus far lacked formal foundation, and correcting that is my intention here. In providing a solid formal foundation for nonlinear planning, McAllester and Rosenblitt's paper 16] was both a step forward and a step back; although it formalized many ideas that had previously eluded precise description, it omitted many of the procedural tricks that make implemented planners e ective. As a result, formally well-grounded planners such as that described by Penberthy and Weld 18] typically exhibit performance far worse than that of the informal systems that preceded them. My hope here is to shed some formal light on the ideas that have proven so e ective in practice.
2 Plans I will adopt the view that a plan is a partially ordered collection of actions, where an action is a functional expression such as move(a; b):
De nition 2.1 An action is either a variable or a functional expression, where the arguments to the function may themselves include variables. A ground action is an action that contains no variables.
By an action such as move(a; ?) we will mean the action of moving a to the location ? where ? will presumably be determined by other considerations.
We cannot now simply de ne a plan to be a partially ordered sequence of actions, since we need to be able to distinguish between (1) and (2) . In some cases, we will want the action a to precede b immediately, while in others, there may be many actions interspersed between the two. We handle this as follows:
De nition 2.2 A plan is a triple (A; ; ) where A is a nite collection of actions and is a partial order on A; by a b for actions a; b 2 A we mean that a must precede b. is another binary relation on A with <, so that whenever a b, a < b as well. We will assume that and also satisfy the following conditions: We will assume throughout this paper that all plans are bounded.
The general turkey-roasting plan (1) corresponds to the partial order d i < stuff < roast < d t while the plan that roasts the turkey immediately after stu ng it corresponds to d i < stuff roast < d t The second inequality has been made an instance of .
Before proceeding, let me spend a moment discussing the di erence between , our annotation for the links in a partially-ordered plan, and the causal annotations introduced by McAllester and Rosenblitt 16] .
McAllester and Rosenblitt's links serve more a bookkeeping function than anything else; the information they contain (which action is intended to achieve which precondition) could be recovered, if need be, from the plan being constructed. Recording the information on the arcs serves the computational purpose of making the plans more e cient to work with.
Our annotation is di erent. Annotating an arc with makes the associated plan a semantically di erent object, in the sense that we have added a new constraint to the set of linearizations of the given plan. Note also that our language is fundamentally more exible than McAllester and Rosenblitt's { we allow the addition of arbitrary new actions to plans, while he does not. This is important, since it enables us to work with the exible plan (1) instead of the far more restrictive (3). An action can have at most one immediate predecessor or successor.
Suppose now that we have some plan (A; ; It is clear that for each action x, i(x) = xj . The image of in (7) under i is the partial order d i < stuff(turkey) < roast(turkey) < d t and is clearly included in the partial order of (6); the image of under i contains the single pair stuff(turkey) roast (turkey) and is once again contained in the of (6).
Proposition 2.9 The instance relation of De nition 2.8 is a partial order.
We will write P 1 P 2 to denote the fact that a plan P 1 is an instance of another plan P 2 .
We have been careful in our de nitions not to restrict the number of new actions that can be inserted between any two actions of the plan itself. When it comes time to actually execute the plan, however, we will need to select a speci c action sequence.
De nition 2.10 A plan P = (A; ; ) will be called linear if the following conditions hold:
1. Every action in A is ground.
= .
A linear plan that is an instance of a plan P will be called a linearization of P. In other words, a linearization of a plan replaces all of the variables with object constants and selects an ordering of the actions involved that can be derived solely from the immediacy conditions of . This latter condition implies that no additional actions can be added to the plan.
As an example, the linear plan (3) Given the above result, it makes sense to think of a plan in terms of its linearizations; each linearization is a way in which we might actually go about executing the actions in the plan.
Approximate correctness
Given now that there will almost inevitably be mistakes we can make, in the sense that there are linearizations of a given plan that do not actually achieve our intended result, how can we formalize the idea that the plan in (1) is correct \in general"?
The solution we will use is an extension of an idea I proposed in 1991 It is a solution in that there are many places to which we can move C, and the one that doesn't work is in some sense pathological { most locations do work. What we need to do is to capture the way in which the set of exceptions is small relative to the set of possibilities.
From a formal point of view, the exception involves a speci c binding for the variable ?. This leads us to the following:
De nition 3.1 Given a binding list and a plan P = (A; ; ), the result of applying to P is de ned to be that plan where the actions in A have had the binding list applied to them but the plan is otherwise unchanged. This plan will be denoted Pj .
We can, for example, bind ? to A in (8) to obtain move(C; A) move(A; B)] The following result is obvious: Lemma 3.2 Given a plan P and binding list , Pj P.
We are now in a position to describe conditions under which one set of plans is \small" relative to another. We need to be careful, however, since plans generally have in nitely many linearizations and we can't simply say that Q is small relative to P if Q has many fewer linearizations than P does. Instead, we will say that Q is small relative to P if Q = Pj but Q 6 = P. The motivation behind this de nition is that there are generally many ways to bind any particular variable and Q is committed to a speci c choice.
In the following de nition, we will say that Q is of measure 0 in P instead of simply saying that Q is small relative to P. The term is borrowed from real analysis, and we use it because the formal de nition of smallness has many of the same properties as does the analytic de nition on which it is modelled. (The nite union of small sets is small, for example.) The 0 means that the ratio of the size of Q to that of P is approximately 0; we will also say that Q is \of measure 1" in P if this ratio is approximately 1, so that Q and P are comparably sized.
De nition 3.3 A plan Q will be said to be of measure 0 in a plan P if Q 6 = P but Q = Pj for some binding list . A plan or plan set Q will also be said to be of measure 0 in a plan or plan set P if either of the following conditions is satis ed:
1. Q is the nite union of sets of measure 0 in P.
2. There exist plan sets R and S with Q R and both R and S ? P of measure 0 in S.
The requirement that Q 6 = P ensures that the binding list is not trivial.
The second condition in the de nition handles cases where Q is a subset of a set of measure 0 in P (take S = P), or where, for example, one speci c linearization has been removed from P. Adding that linearization back to P should not impact the question of whether Q is of measure 0 in P (take S to be the union of P and the missing linearization).
As an example, the plan . . . move(a; b) . . .] (9) is of measure 0 in the plan . . . move(a; ?) . . .] (10) since the variable ? has been bound to a constant in (9) . But the plan . . . move(a; b)] (11) is not of measure 0 in the plan (9) , since the di erence between the two plans is not the binding of a variable but the fact that the action move(a; b) is the nal action in (11) (i.e., an immediate predecessor of the plan's terminal action) but not in (9) . For similar reasons, a plan where two actions a 1 and a 2 are sequential is not of measure 0 in the plan where the actions are unordered.
Since (9) is of measure 0 in the plan set (10) and (11) is an instance (i.e., a subset) of (9), (11) is of measure 0 in (10) as well. Finally, (9) is also of measure 0 in the plan set given by removing . . . move(a; c) . . .] (12) from (10) . After all, if binding ? to b reduces us to a set that is small relative to the set of all possible bindings, removing a single one of those possible bindings in advance shouldn't change this conclusion. The second condition in De nition 3.3 allows us to continue to measure the size of a plan set relative to (10) even after (12) has been removed.
What about adding new actions to a plan? If we add variable actions, the result will in general not be of measure 0 in the original plan; we are only committing to doing \something" and most of the linearizations of the original plan include additional actions of one form or another in any event. But if we add a speci c action, the story is di erent: Proposition 3.4 Let P be a plan, and P 0 an instance of P with i the associated injection from A to A 0 . Then if there is any action in A 0 ?i(A) that is not a variable, P 0 is of measure 0 in P.
De nition 3.5 A plan set Q will be said to be of measure 1 in P if P ? Q is of measure 0 in P. Two plans sets will be called approximately equal if each is of measure 1 in the other. Lemma 3.6 Q is of measure 0 in P if any of the following conditions holds:
1. Q is empty. 2. Q is a subset of a set of measure 0 in P. 3 . Q is of measure 0 in a subset of P. 4 . Q is of measure 0 in a superset S of P with P of measure 1 in S.
Lemma 3.7 Q is of measure 0 in P if and only if Q is of measure 0 in P Q. Proposition 3.8 Approximate equality is an equivalence relation.
We also have the following: Proposition 3.9 Let P 6 = be a plan set. Then provided that our language includes in nitely many object and action constants, there is no plan set that is both of measure 0 and of measure 1 in P.
It is this result that gives teeth to the ideas we are proposing; if there were a plan of both measure 0 and measure 1 in P, we would be able to return as \generally correct" plans that in fact failed for large fractions of their linearizations.
The requirement that there be in nitely many constants is a necessary one. If, for example, there were only 37 places to which an object could be moved, we could use the fact that each speci c choice is of measure 0 in the overall plan to conclude that the union of all of them was { thereby violating Proposition 3.9. Similarly, if the set of actions we could take were circumscribed in some way, we could use Proposition 3.4 to nd a counterexample to the above proposition.
Finally, we present some technical results that we will need later. We begin by recalling the usual de nition of convergence for a sequence S i of sets:
De nition 3.10 Let S i be a sequence of (plan) sets. Then we will say that the S i converge to a set S if for any x, there is some index m(x) such that for i > m(x), x 2 S i if and only if x 2 S. Lemma 3.11 Suppose we have a sequence P i of plan sets, where P i+1 is of measure 0 in P i for each i. Then the P i converge to the empty set.
Every in nite descending chain where each element is of measure 0 in the previous one converges to the empty set.
It is not the case that there is no in nite descending chain of plan sets, each of measure 0 in the previous one. For any function constant f, we can get such a chain by considering 
Planning
Having introduced these notions, we need to use them to construct a planner. Before doing so, however, let me be clear about the problem that I am hoping to address. Our focus here is on planning itself, as opposed to reasoning about action or simulation. In other words, we will assume that the semantics of actions are somehow provided to us; somewhat more speci cally, we assume that given a linear plan L and a goal g, we have some way to tell whether or not g holds after L is executed. From a formal point of view, we will assume that given a goal g, we can take L(g) to be the set of all linear plans that achieve g. The analysis we are about to present is independent of the speci c semantics of action underlying the function L.
In the examples, of course, we will need to rely on a speci c semantics of action. For the blocks world, this semantics is presumably intuitive and corresponds to the usual strips description. The only di erence between our interpretation and the conventional one is that we need some way to interpret actions that are attempted even though their preconditions are not satis ed; we will take the view that such actions simply have no e ect on the domain in question.
We now make the following de nition:
De nition 4.1 A planning system P accepts as input a goal g and a plan set P. It returns a plan set P(g; P) P that is approximately equal to L(g) \ P. In some cases, we will assume that the goal is xed, writing P g for the corresponding function that accepts the plan set P only.
The plan set P can be used to focus the planner's attention on plans of a particular form.
The condition that P(g; P) be of measure 1 in L(g) \ P means that almost all { but not necessarily all { of the plans in P that would achieve g are actually returned by the planner. In more picturesque terms, the planner is \approximately complete."
The condition that L(g) \ P be of measure 1 in P(g; P) means that almost all the plans returned by the planner achieve the goal; in other words, the planner is approximately correct. In a situation like this, where L(g) is of measure 1 in a plan set P, we will often say that P \generally achieves" g. In the remainder of this section, we will begin by discussing planning systems in general, describing implementation concerns that are likely to arise in their construction. There are then two technical issues that we will address. First, we will show that a planning system can be used to produce answers to planning queries that actually are correct and complete, at least in the limit. More precisely, we will show how a planning system can be used to construct a sequence of answers that converges on the actual set L(g). Second, we will show how a planning system can respond to a conjunctive goal g 1^g2 by invoking itself only on the subgoals g 1 and g 2 separately and then combining the results. More precisely, we will show how P g 1^g2 can be constructed from P g 1 and P g 2 .
We begin by discussing P g itself. On an intuitive level, the way P g works is as follows:
Given the goal g, we nd the actions a that might succeed in establishing g. If the preconditions to these actions are in general satis ed (perhaps because these preconditions hold in the initial situation), we can take P(G) to be the union of plan sets of the form . . . a . . .] (13) for each action a achieving g.
If the preconditions of a are not in general satis ed, we can invoke P recursively on each precondition, merge the results to obtain plans that enable a, and then append a to the end of such plans. The result (13) is in fact a special case of this observation; if the preconditions to a are known to hold in the initial state ], these preconditions also hold in a plan set that is approximately equal to . . .] (the set of all plans). The expression (13) is simply the result of appending a to the end of such plans.
We will see in what follows that we are often interested not only in P g , which constructs plans for achieving g, but also in P :g , which tells us which elements of a particular plan set fail to achieve g. This has obvious analogs in existing planners:
1. In a system like tweak 3. Finally, we will discuss in Section 5 the use of a declarative system to construct P g and P :g . Before turning to technical issues, let us look at an example in a bit more detail. The problem we will consider is the well-known Sussman anomaly 19], shown in Figure 2 . The goal is to get A on B and B on C. At this point, we consider the subgoals separately.
The rst of these involves simply getting B on C. This is generally achieved by the plan . . . move(B; C) . . .] (14) Although there are instances of (14) that do not succeed in getting B on C, there are only a nite number of ways for this to happen { something must be put on B or on C, or B has to be moved away from C at the end of the plan. Each of these exceptions is of measure 0 in (14) , which is why the plan (14) generally achieves on(B; C). Furthermore, move(B; C) is the only action with on(B; C) in its add list, and the preconditions to this action hold in the initial situation. This implies that the plan set of (14) is approximately equal to the set of all plans for getting B onto C and we can take P(on(B; C); . . .]) = . . . move(B; C) . . .] ( 
15)
The two conditions of approximate equality are satis ed: Most plans that achieve the goal are instances of the above plan (in fact, they all are), and the exceptions are a set of measure 0 in (15) .
To continue the analysis, we compute P(:on(B; C); . . .move(B; C) . . .]) in order to determine which elements of (15) The only remaining possibility is where B is not on C at the end of the plan because it is moved away. Combining this with (16) and (17), we see that we can take P(:on (B; C) to nd those elements of the exception set that achieve the goal after all, and so on. As we will see shortly, a sequence constructed in this fashion will eventually converge on the set of all plans that achieve the goal of getting B on C. In less formal terms, the plan (19) can fail for the following reasons:
1. The attempt to move C out of the way can fail. This may happen because something has been moved on top of C (f 1 ) or because something has already been moved to C's intended destination (f 2 ). 2. Something may be moved onto A (f 3 or f 6 ) or onto B (f 4 or f 7 ). We get two exceptions in each case here depending on whether the block moved into the way is C (f 6 and f 7 ) or not (f 3 and f 4 ). 3. A may be moved o of B after it is put there (f 5 ). Because all of the exceptions are of measure 0 in (19) , (19) itself is a satisfactory choice for P(on (A; B) 
and is therefore not of measure 0 in f 0 3 . Again, recall that our semantics of failed actions is that they have no e ect at all. Since A is not clear in Figure 2 , the rst action of (22) fails and (22) e ectively reduces to (19) .
From a computational point of view, it may be more attractive to work with f 0 3 than to work with the more accurate f 3 appearing in (20) . The reason is that f 0 3 is already of measure 0 in the original plan (19) , and it is simpler than f 3 and therefore presumably easier to generate. It is obviously easier to stop as soon as a set of measure 0 in the original plan is encountered than to complete the analysis to obtain f 3 instead of f 0 3 . This is exactly what commonsense planners should do { when we plan for one of a set of conjuncts, we only worry about what might go wrong until we feel con dent in dismissing it. In our running example, we know that something will go wrong with the plan of moving A to B if we move an additional block onto A. The need for this extra action ensures that we are looking at a set of measure 0 in our overall plan, so we don't think about it further. More speci cally, we don't bother to draw the conclusion that we can only move something onto A after C is cleared o the top of it. It is to remain in keeping with this approach that may wish to work with f 0 3 instead of f 3 . The general version of this construction is similar. At each odd-numbered step (including the rst), we look for plans that achieve the goal but that we have not yet identi ed. At even-numbered steps, we look for exceptions to the plans found thus far:
De nition 4.2 Given a planning system P and a goal g, the planning sequence generated by P for g is given by P i (g) = P i?1 (g) P(g; P ? P i?1 (g)); if i is odd; P i?1 (g) ? P(:g; P i?1 (g)); if i is even.
The sequence is initialized by P 0 (g) = .
Some notation will make this de nition easier to work with. If we write D i for the symmetric di erence between P i and P i?1 , it su ces to describe only how D i is computed at each step. We know that D i has to be added to P i at odd steps and removed at even steps. Now (23) becomes: D i (g) = P(g; P ? P i?1 (g)); if i is odd; P(:g; P i?1 (g)); if i is even. If we know that we caught all of the exceptions at the i ? 2nd step, we will know that P(:g; P i?2 (g)) = and we can replace (25) with the simpler D i (g) = P(:g; D i?1 (g))
In a similar way, if we know that D i?1 (g) includes all the plans that achieve g at an odd step, we can conclude D i (g) = P(g; D i?1 (g)) (27) In both (26) and (27), the purpose of each step is to correct possible incorrectness in the previous step; possible incompleteness in the previous step is not an issue.
We are now in a position to achieve the rst of our two technical goals in this section:
Theorem 4.3 Given a planning system P and a goal g, the planning sequence generated by P for g converges to L(g).
This result shows us how to construct a planner that is correct and complete from one that is approximately correct and approximately complete. Our remaining goal is that of showing how to combine the planner's results for g 1 and for g 2 to obtain a plan for g 1^g2 . Presumably, the semantics underlying L is such that a plan achieves the conjunctive goal g 1^g2 if and only if it achieves both g 1 and g 2 , so that
The following result is now obvious: Lemma 4.4 Suppose that P 1 achieves a goal g 1 and that P 2 achieves g 2 . Then P 1 \ P 2 achieves g 1^g2 .
The problem, of course, is that P 1 \ P 2 may well be empty if P 1 and P 2 are speci c linear plans that achieve the goals. If we could weaken the above lemma to require only that the plans generally achieve their goals, we could use the fact that (14) generally achieves on(B; C) and that (19) 
This plan involves three actions { moving B to C, moving C out of the way, and moving A to B. C must be moved before A is put on B, but there are no other ordering constraints involved. Unfortunately, this is not a solution to the Sussman anomaly, since it allows the action of moving B to C to precede the action of moving C out of the way. Here is the general problem: Proposition 4.5 There exist plans P 1 , P 2 , Q 1 and Q 2 with Q i of measure 0 in P i but Q 1 \Q 2 of measure 1 in P 1 \ P 2 .
The Sussman anomaly isn't quite this bad; the correct plan . .] because we must take the additional action of moving C to the table. In terms of the proposition, the P i are the plans for achieving the subgoals, and the Q i are the exception sets for these plans.
We cannot necessarily merge speci c plans for achieving the individual conjuncts. Nor, as Proposition 4.5 tells us, can we necessarily nd a plan for the conjunctive goal by merging plans for generally achieving the conjuncts. But we do have the following, an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.3: Corollary 4.6 Given a planning system P and goals g 1 and g 2 , denote by P i (g) the planning sequence generated by P for g. Then the sequence P i (g 1 ) \ P i (g 2 )
converges to L(g 1^g2 ), the plan for achieving the conjunction of g 1 and g 2 .
This result is evidence that we are on the right track, although we need to do a bit better { taking the limit in (29) will not be viable in practice. More precisely, we need a way to compute P g 1^g2 that we can guarantee to satisfy the requirements of De nition 4.1.
To see how to do this, let us look at the Sussman anomaly in a bit more detail.
We already know how to construct the rst two terms in the planning sequences for the subgoals; they are The second element of the sequence involves removing from P 1 the exceptions in either (18) or (20) . We can compute these by combining, for example, the plan e 1 = . . . move (?1; B 
The rst of the above plans is the \obvious" merge where the two separate plans are simply executed in parallel. In the second, the variable ?1 is bound to A and the rst action in e 1 is identi ed with the second action in P 1 (on (A; B) ). The ordering on the resulting action sequence is accumulated from the orderings on e 1 and on P 1 (on (A; B) ). The third plan is similar, with ? being bound to B and ?1 bound to C.
Each of the three plans fails to achieve the subgoal of getting B onto C. In (33), a new (and currently unidenti ed) block is moved onto B. In (34), A is moved onto B before B is moved onto C. And nally, C itself is moved onto B in (35).
It is only (34) that is of interest to us. The plan (33) is of measure 0 in the set of exceptions because it involves an additional action, and (35) is of measure 0 because it binds the variable ?. As we have already remarked, (34) tells us that if we move A to B before moving B to C, we will not achieve our overall goal because B will be occupied when we try to move it.
We can continue in this fashion, accumulating all of the exceptions to the overall plan (30). In addition to (34), the only plan not of measure 0 in the set of all exceptions is . . . move(B; C) . . .move(C; ?) . . . move(A; B) . . .] which is part of the result of merging P 1 (on(B; C)) and f 1 ; this tells us that if we move B to C too early, our plan for getting C out of the way en route to moving A will fail.
We can conclude from all this that a generally valid plan for solving the Sussman anomaly is given by removing from the plan (30) the union of the two plans 
which is indeed the usual solution to the original problem.
Here is the result dealing with the general situation:
Theorem 4.7 Suppose that we have a conjunctive goal g 1^g2 and a set P. Construct the plan sequences P i converging to L(g 1 ) \ P and Q i converging to L(g 2 ) \ P. Now we can always nd an i and a j such that both P i P i+1 and Q j Q j+1 are of measure 0 in P i \ Q j . For any such i and j, P i \ Q j will be approximately equal to L(g 1^g2 ) \ P.
In our analysis of the Sussman anomaly, we actually terminated the construction of the plans for the subgoals somewhat earlier than the points sanctioned by the above result. This early termination re ects some lookahead on our part; consider, for example, the fact that the exception e 1 = . . . 
The reason for this is that the initial action of moving A to B will fail (C is still in the way), so B will wind up on C after all. Now (39) is an instance of (40) and therefore might not be an exception to the general plan of getting B onto C. The recognition that binding ? to A in . . . move(?; B) . . . move(B; C) . . .] is an exception to the overall plan is subtle. Roughly speaking, we need the action of moving A to B to succeed (in order to achieve the other subgoal), so moving B to C will indeed be blocked. In terms of Theorem 4.7, (40) isn't an exception to the plan for getting B on C, but 
is an exception, and that's what matters. Once we have identi ed (41) as an exception to the original plan, the conditions of Theorem 4.7 are satis ed and we can construct the overall plan (36) with con dence. As a nal example, let us consider the tower-construction problem once again. The problem is repeated in Figure 3 ; recall that the goal is to get A on B and B on C without ever building a 4-block tower.
The planning sequence for getting B on C begins with P 1 = . . . move(B; C From a commonsense point of view, we can't put A on B rst because we will then be unable to get B to C, and can't put B on C rst because this might (and in fact does) make a 3-block tower to which A cannot be added.
There are two ways in which the analysis can be extended. The exceptions (47) and (48) are the result of intersections with (42) and (46), so one of these two sets must be analyzed further. Since f 0 4 is an approximation, it seems natural to work on this rst, leading to f 1 = . (50) The nal line (50) indicates that one way to make B the top block in a 3-block stack is to move ? to ?1 and then B to ?. This is of measure 0 in our prospective solution (45), however, so we need not worry about it. 4 The problem continues to be (49), which is still enough to invalidate our original plan. We now have to choose between nding exceptions to (49), nding a way to move B to C without creating a 3-block tower, and nding exceptions to (42), nding a way to move A to B before moving B to C. Let So we turn our attention to (49); if we begin by moving C, then we will in fact be able to move A to B after all. So we can achieve on(A; B) using the plan . .
. move(C; ?) . . . move(B; C) . . .move(A; B) . . .] (53)
Unfortunately, this still might not work, since moving C (potentially to the top of a 3-block stack) may cause a problem in getting B to C as indicated in the original plan (44) for achieving this subgoal. But now we nally replace (44) with the more appropriate (43), allowing us to conclude that (53) does indeed generally achieve the goal of getting A on B and B on C. The analysis would be very di erent if we were to work with a more conventional planner. There, the fact that we cannot build a 4-block tower would be encoded by adding a new precondition to the move operator, saying that in order to move x to y, either y must be on the table, or it must be on a block that is on the table. Now when we try to move B to C, we will naturally generate the plan of rst moving C to the table (since C being on the table is one possible way to achieve the disjunctive precondition). This plan can then be extended to solve the problem but the plan itself has been constructed blindly instead of in response to an identi ed bug in the simple plan of putting B on C and then A on B.
In our approach, the problem is identi ed in (46), which is later re ned into (49) and (53). A plan to overcome the 4-block di culty is generated only when it is needed, and not as part of a general attempt to get B onto C.
There is another di erence in the treatments of this example as well. Consider a conventional planner that proceeds by rst planning to move B to C, and then planning to move A to B. When the di culty is found and the plan for getting B onto C has to be modi ed, the ensuing backtrack will discard the plan for getting A onto B. Not much work is lost in our simple example, but in more complex problems it may be crucial to avoid replanning for the goal of getting A onto B. After all, the existing plan for achieving this subgoal is the correct one.
The approach that we have described behaves in this fashion. A; B) . . .] all continue to use the fundamental plan (54). In fact, work is in some sense never discarded in our approach, since we proceed by gradually re ning plan sets in ways that are suggested by the merging computations and by corresponding interactions among subgoals. In our framework, the plan for constructing the tower is built up by starting with the basic plans of moving B to C and A to B, and then debugging the result. This leads to a much more focussed search process than that associated with conventional methods.
Implementation considerations
In order to actually build a planning system based on the ideas that we have described, there are three separate problems that need to be addressed. First, we need to discuss the manipulation of plan sets, including the underlying operation of plan intersection. Second, we need to describe the construction of a system that can produce the plan sets in the rst place. And nally, we need to discuss implementation details surrounding results like Theorem 4.7; there are several simple ideas that can make this result substantially more e ective in practice. (Witness the footnote in the previous section.) We will deal with these issues in this order.
Plan intersection and manipulating plan sets
Plan intersection is often known as plan merging and has already been discussed by a variety of authors; typical is the treatment of Foulser et.al 4]. The construction described there is related to ours, although not identical. Foulser et.al allow for the possibility that more than two plans be merged at once, but their plan description language is more restricted than ours. In keeping with conventional interests, they assume that the actions in a plan are sequential; no others can be interspersed as new information is obtained. As a result, they do not draw the distinction between and that was our focus in Section 2. Nevertheless, the ideas introduced by Foulser and his coauthors 4] can be used to implement our somewhat more general notion of plan intersection. The method used continues to be that of treating sequences of actions (actions related by in our notation) as atomic units, and then merging larger structures made up of these units. The details are not of any great theoretical interest and the interested reader is referred to the code itself. 5 One thing that does bear mention is that the result of intersecting two plans may be a plan set that cannot be represented as a single plan; witness the construction of (33), (34) and (35) from the intersection of (31) and (32). The implementation obviously needs to cater to this possibility.
Manipulating general plan sets is a bit more interesting. This is quite a di cult problem but is made simpler in practice by the recognition that the plan sets under consideration are generally of the form
where the D i are the symmetric di erences of successive P i and are in general fairly simply represented. The evaluation here is intended to be from left to right, so that (55) is in fact
The implementation is constructed in just this way, representing any particular plan set as an alternating sum such as (55). Taking the union or intersection of these alternating sums is tedious but not terribly di cult.
Of course, the manipulations involved are fundamentally dependent on the plan intersection operation that we described earlier. Existing planners work with global data structures, gradually accumulating actions into an overall plan. This makes their plans somewhat brittle, since they will need to discard a great deal of existing work when a portion of the plan changes. A system such as we have described plans for subgoals separately but must frequently merge the plans involved in order to understand possible subgoal interactions.
The upshot of this is that the speed of a planner built on our ideas will be crucially dependent on the speed of the underlying mechanism for plan merging; as Foulser et.al point out, plan merging can be exponentially expensive. They also point out, however, that this exponential expense appears not to be incurred in practice because the plans being merged consist of small numbers of linear segments. This matches our experience. Finally, since speci c plan segments tend to appear many times in the analysis, the overall computation can be speeded substantially by caching the results of the merging computation in some way. 6 
Constructing plan sets
Given an implementation that manipulates plan sets, from where are we to obtain these sets in the rst place? There are three sources:
1. Information about the initial situation (corresponding to the plan ]) can be encoded in this fashion. Thus in the tower-construction example, we know that on(C; D) is de nitely achieved by the plan ]. It follows that on(C; D) is generally achieved by the universal plan set . . .].
2. Information about actions occurring (although perhaps not succeeding) is encoded similarly. For any action a, the statement \a has just occurred" is true for the plan . . . a]. What this says that that a occurs at the end of any sequence of actions that does indeed end in a. 3 . Finally, there are operations that transform plan sets into new plan sets. We have already seen one of these in the form of intersection; another corresponds to the frame axiom in our setting.
De nition 5.1 There exists a frame operator F that accepts as input two plan sets and returns another plan set. The operator is de ned so that if a particular goal or uent g is inserted into the database by those plans in the set P + and deleted from the database by those plans in P ? , then L(g) = F(P + ; P ? ). Somewhat less formally, the goal is achieved by plans in F(P + ; P ? ) and not achieved by plans outside this set. Note that the equality in the de nition is exact, not approximate.
As an example, we would expect to have
What this tells us is that if a uent is true in the initial situation, and we know of no reason for it to be false in other situations, we can expect it to be true at all times.
Here is another example:
If an action a succeeds in achieving a goal and no other actions delete that goal, then we can use the frame axiom to conclude that the goal continues to hold after additional actions occur.
Here is a slightly more interesting example. Suppose that some goal is added to the database by the plan . 
since if both actions a and b occur, the goal will be true only if a occurs after b does. This ts neatly into the implementation details already discussed; the plan set (57) is conveniently written as an alternating sum.
It is because of examples such as this one that the operator F is de ned on pairs of plan sets. We cannot nd a unary F 0 such that F(P; Q) = F 0 (P ) ? F 0 (Q) because, as we see from (57), the plan sets P and Q interact in the construction of F(P; Q).
The reason the frame operator is important is because a planning database will typically indicate only which actions actually add and delete uents from the domain description; there will be no explicit description of the set of plans that achieve a given goal g. In order to construct these plans, we have to nd the plans that add g to the database, and then use the frame operator F to actually construct the plan set in its entirety. Working with actions that delete g allows us to compute P :g similarly.
In all of the examples we have encountered, if P and P 0 are approximately equal and Q and Q 0 are as well, then F(P; Q) is approximately equal to F(P 0 ; Q 0 ). This is as it should be if our ideas are to be usefully incorporated into systems that use the frame axiom; it also serves to provide loose con rmation of the utility of our measure-theoretic notion of when one set of plans is small relative to another.
The function F has a variety of analogs in earlier work. We have already remarked on its clear connection to the frame axiom; since it is accepts information about the plans where facts are added or deleted from the database and returns information about when those facts hold generally, it is also the analog in our setting of what Chapman and others have called the modal truth criterion 1].
The collection of all plan sets is a lattice under the subset relation; more formally, the set of plan sets is naturally isomorphic to the set of functions from the set S of linear plans into the two-point set 2 = ft; fg. For a particular plan set P and plan p, P(p) = t if p 2 P and P(p) = f otherwise. The set 2 S inherits a lattice structure from the lattice structure on 2, and it is not hard to extend this structure to embed 2 S in a bilattice 5]. A function that maps bilattice elements to new bilattice elements is referred to as a modal operator 7] because there is a natural relationship between such functions and the existing notion of modality 15] in the philosophical community, and F is indeed a modal operator in this setting. I also suggest elsewhere 6] that the frame operator can be viewed modally.
The point of this embedding is that it allows us to treat F as a semantic object in a bilattice setting. We can use the declarative mechanisms that exist in the bilattice framework to manipulate the plan sets in question; we do not need to construct a special-purpose planner but can instead resort to a general multivalued theorem prover 9, 11]. All we need do is provide a declarative description of action.
The rst axiom in this declarative description needs to capture a strips-like frame axiom as in De nition 5.1. To do this, consider the statement \g has just been achieved." This sentence is true for plans sets that terminate with an action that adds g; \g has just been removed" is true for plan sets that terminate in actions deleting g.
To formalize this, we reify g and add a predicate triggers; we will take triggers(g) to mean that g has just been added and triggers(:g) to mean that g has just been deleted.
Using the frame modality F, we can now write F triggers(g); triggers(:g)] holds (g) This allows us to use the information in F to nd plan sets that achieve g (i.e., plan sets for which g holds).
The rest of the axiomatization de nes the extent of triggers:
adds(a; p)^succeeds(a) 
Axioms (58) and (59) tell us that successful actions add and delete facts as appropriate to the database, and the remaining axioms describe situations under which actions succeed { they succeed if they occur and all of their preconditions are satis ed. A list of preconditions is satis ed if the rst one is and all the rest are; the ground case is that an empty list of preconditions is always satis ed. The bracketed expressions in (61) and (62) are lists of preconditions and should not be confused with plans. Finally, we need to identify situations in which actions occur, so that the sentence occurs(a) is assigned the plan set . . . a] and succeeds(init) is assigned the plan set ] where init is a dummy action that sets up the initial situation. (We could instead say that init occurs in the initial situation and has no preconditions, but that would be somewhat less compact.) We can now add speci c information about the initial situation by writing, for example, that adds(init; on(C; D)) to say that C is on D in the initial situation.
There are other advantages to exploiting the bilattice machinery for planning purposes, since this approach allows us to use a declarative description of action instead of a procedural one. We can add actions that require some variable amount of time to take e ect (boiling water comes to mind), have e ects without duration (like popping a balloon causing a noise) 8], or have rami cations that need to be computed based on the values of other uents 3, 13]. All of this work remains in the same overall declarative framework and continues to use this framework to provide the machinery needed for planning. As discussed elsewhere 12], we can also introduce defaults into the declarative language, thereby capturing in our setting the ideas typically associated with hierarchical planners.
Status
The current implementation is a good { but not perfect { match for the theoretical constructs that we have discussed. Plans and plan sets are both implemented as described. The examples of Section 4 make some speci c control assumptions about the nature of the search, and these control decisions are not yet supported by the implementation. (In a bilattice setting, they appear to be restrictions to planning of more general control heuristics, and we are attempting to implement these general control notions as opposed to specializations of them.)
Rather than invoke Theorem 4.7 directly, the planner works by determining at each point whether a particular line of reasoning will have a signi cant impact on its overall answer. In other words, it decides whether or not its answer would change on a set of measure 0 relative to the current value. This is in keeping with the analysis of Section 4, where we curtailed some portion of the analysis as soon as we could tell that the answer didn't matter. Theorem 4.7 guarantees that there always will be a point at which things are clearly irrelevant; the implementation is often able to terminate its reasoning before the conditions of the theorem are satis ed. Most of the time used by the planner is spent in reasoning of just this sort, deciding whether a particular line of reasoning might impact the plan being generated.
Conclusion
My overall aim in this paper has been to describe a single idea: that planners should manipulate not specialized plans that are guaranteed to achieve their goals, but more general plans that can only be expected to. We have presented a formalization of this idea of \expecting" a plan to achieve a goal in terms of the plan failing for a set of measure 0 in the set of its possible executions.
Building a planner around this idea introduces additional possibilities that existing planners lack; most important among these is that it is possible to combine approximate plans for each of two subgoals to obtain an approximate plan for their conjunction. The main technical result of the paper is Theorem 4.7, which con rms this observation. An examination of the tower-construction problem indicates that such a planner will have advantages over a conventional one in that it will debug plans constructed using independence assumptions as opposed to catering to all possible plan interactions at the outset.
Finally, we discussed brie y an implementation of our ideas that exploits the fact that plan sets can be viewed as elements of a bilattice. As mentioned in the introduction, some existing planners such as O-Plan appear to make informal use of the ideas that we have discussed, but we know of no planner that explicitly conforms to the notions we have presented. A preliminary implementation of such a planner has been built using the bilattice-based theorem prover mvl 11], but many implementation issues remain to be addressed. Dealing with these is the topic of ongoing research. Proof. One direction is easy: if P 1 P 2 , every instance of P 1 is an instance of P 2 because is transitive. For the other direction, suppose that every linearization of P 1 = (A 1 ; 1 ; 1 ) is a linearization of P 2 = (A 2 ; 2 ; 2 ). Speci cally, consider the linear plan L in which 1 has been extended to a total order and the actions in A 1 have been made ground by binding the variables to unique Skolem constants. Since this is a linearization of P 2 , there must be a binding list and injection i that embeds P 2 in L. If we modify to change the Skolem constants back to the variables they represent in A 1 , we get a binding list 0 and injection i : A 2 ! A 1 that injects the actions in A 2 into A 1 . It remains only to show that i preserves and .
If we had a b in P 2 without the corresponding relation holding in P 1 , we could add an extra action between a and b in the linear plan L to construct a plan that was a linearization of P 1 but not of P 2 , so it follows that is preserved.
To see that is preserved, suppose that a b in P 2 but not in P 1 . Now it follows from the lemmas that in P 1 , where a 6 b, if a c or c a, we must not have c b either. Thus b is unordered in P 1 with respect to all the points related to a by . We can continue to satisfy De nition 2.2 if we add (in P 1 ) that b c for all such points; suppose that we call the resulting plan P 0 1 . It is clear that P 0 1 has linearizations that P 2 lacks, since a b in P 1 but a b in P 2 . But since P 0 1 is an instance of P 1 , this is a contradiction. Thus whenever a b in P 2 , a b in P 1 as well. is preserved by i, and the proof is complete. Proposition 3.4 Let P be a plan, and P 0 an instance of P with i the associated injection from A to A 0 . Then if there is any action in A 0 ?i(A) that is not a variable, P 0 is of measure 0 in P.
Proof. Let P 00 be a plan that is identical to P 0 but where some nonvariable action in A 0 ?i(A) has been replaced with a new variable. Now it is clear that P 00 is an instance of P, and that P 0 is of measure 0 in P 00 (since it binds the new variable). Thus P 0 is of measure 0 in P. Lemma 3.6 Q is of measure 0 in P if any of the following conditions holds:
4. Take R = Q and S as given; since P is of measure 1 in S, S ? P is of measure 0 in S. Lemma 3.7 Q is of measure 0 in P if and only if Q is of measure 0 in P Q. Proof. Since P P Q, it is clear that Q is of measure 0 in the union if it is of measure 0 in P. For the converse, take R = Q and S = P Q in the de nition; since Q is of measure 0 in S, we must have S ? P of measure 0 in S as well. Thus Q is of measure 0 in P. Proposition Proposition 3.9 Let P 6 = be a plan set. Then provided that our language includes in nitely many object and action constants, there is no plan set that is both of measure 0 and of measure 1 in P.
Proof. The proof of this result is essentially unchanged from that of the analogous Proposition 3.3 of 10]. If there were a subset Q of a plan set P that was both of measure 0 and of measure 1 in P, then we could repeatedly apply the secondary clauses of De nition 3.3 to construct a nite collection of plan sets Q i and a plan set S = i Q i such that each Q i = Sj i for some nontrivial i .
We can suppose without loss of generality that S contains a single variable ?; the general case is no harder. For s j an arbitrary Skolem constant in our language, let S j be a linearization of S in which ? has been bound to s j . Since S j will be an instance of Q i = Sj i only if i binds ? to s j , it follows that each Q i can contain at most one of the various S j . Since there are an in nite number of Skolem constants available, S cannot be the union of nitely many Q i .
Lemma 3.11 Suppose we have a sequence P i of plan sets, where P i+1 is of measure 0 in P i for each i. Then the P i converge to the empty set.
Proof. Let P be an arbitrary linear plan that appears in in nitely many of the P i , and consider only the subsequence of the P i 's whose elements contain P. We can assume without loss of generality that each P i contains P i+1 , since P i+1 is of measure 0 in P i if and only if it is of measure 0 in the union P i P i+1 ; we can also assume that each P i is a minimal such set such that P i+1 is of measure 0 in P i .
Given these assumptions, P i must have been constructed from P i+1 by either replacing a subexpression with a variable (for example, replacing move(x; block-on(?)) with move(x; ?)) or by introducing a new variable to replace an object constant or variable in the plan. Since if the eventual plan P contains n object or action constants it will contain at most n subexpressions as well, it follows that the maximum length of a chain where every element contains P will be n 2 . This is in con ict with the assumption that P appears in in nitely many P i , and the proof is complete. Lemma 3.12 Suppose S is of measure 1 in T and of measure 0 in U. Then T is of measure 0 in U.
Proof. We show instead that T is of measure 0 in T U, which is equivalent. We know that T ? S is of measure 0 in T, thus of measure 0 in T U. S is also of measure 0 in T U, so T (T ? S) S is of measure 0 in T U as well. Proposition 3. But we also have that since E F is of measure 0 in A, it is of measure 0 in A E F = B F. Thus F is of measure 0 in B F, and F is of measure 0 in B. In other words, B is of measure 1 in B F. Since E is also of measure 0 in B F, it follows that E is of measure 0 in B and A is of measure 1 in B. Thus A and B are approximately equal. Theorem 4.3 Given a planning system P and a goal g, the planning sequence generated by P for g converges to L(g). Proof. We begin by showing that the sequence converges, and then argue that it converges to L(g).
To see that it converges, it su ces to show that the symmetric di erences between successive elements of the planning sequence converge to the empty set. But at each step of the construction we will have (for example) D i (g) = P(:g; P i?1 (g)) for i even. Now suppose that we construct a new sequence S i , where S i = D 2i D 2i+1 . We can apply Lemma 3.11 to conclude that the S i converge to , from which it follows that the D i do as well. Thus the planning sequence converges.
The argument that it converges to L(g) is similar; at each step in the construction, we remove a set of measure 1 in the remaining error. Thus the sequence of symmetric di erences between P i (g) and L(g) also converges to , and the proof is complete. Proposition 4.5 There exist plans P 1 , P 2 , Q 1 and Q 2 with Q i of measure 0 in P i but Q 1 \Q 2 of measure 1 in P 1 \ P 2 .
Proof. An example follows the statement of the proposition in the main text. Theorem 4.7 Suppose that we have a conjunctive goal g 1^g2 and a set P. Construct the plan sequences P i converging to L(g 1 ) \ P and Q i converging to L(g 2 ) \ P. Now we can always nd an i and a j such that both P i P i+1 and Q j Q j+1 are of measure 0 in P i \ Q j . For any such i and j, P i \ Q j will be approximately equal to L(g 1^g2 ) \ P. Proof. The proof rests on the following proposition: Proposition A.1 Let f(P 1 ; . . . ; P n ) be a function on plan sets that distributes with respect to set-theoretic union and such that f(P 1 ; . . . ; P n ) P i for each i. Now suppose that for each i, we have a sequence P i1 ; P i2 ; . . . that converges to P i and such that if we take ij = P ij P ij+1 , each ij is of measure 1 in P i P ij . Then provided f(P 1 ; . . . ; P n ) 6 = :
1. There is a collection of indices j i such that ij i is of measure 0 in f(P ij i ) for each i, and 2. For any such set of indices, f(P i ) and f(P ij i ) are approximately equal.
Proof. We prove the result for n = 1 only; the general case is no harder.
Suppose, then, that f(P) is a function on plan sets that distributes with respect to settheoretic union and such that f(P) P. Suppose also that we have a sequence P i that converges to P and such if we take j = P j P j+1 , each j is of measure 1 in P P j . Then provided f(P) 6 = , we must show that:
1. There is an index j such that j is of measure 0 in f(P j ), and 2. For any such index, f(P) and f(P j ) are approximately equal. To see this, x i and say that P = (P i ? A) B, so that P A = P i B. Now f(P) f(A) = f(P i ) f(B) since f distributes with respect to . It follows that f(P) f(P i ) f(A) f(B) A B = P P i and therefore that i is of measure 1 in f(P) f(P i ).
Since f(P) 6 = and the i 's are converging to , it follows that there is some xed j such that j is of measure 0 in f(P). But now we can apply Proposition 3.13 to conclude that f(P) and f(P j ) are approximately equal. Since f(P) and f(P j ) are approximately equal, j must be of measure 0 in f(P j ), and the rst part of the proposition is proved.
The second part of the proposition is proved as well; if j is of measure 0 in f(P j ), we know it is of measure 1 in f(P) f(P j ), so f(P j ) and f(P) must be approximately equal.
To prove the original theorem, we can now simply take f = \; the conditions on the 's are guaranteed by the approximate validity of the fashion in which the planning sequences for the subgoals are constructed.
